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19821 SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
and practical difficulties engendered by Zappone, therefore, it is
hoped that the Court will seize the first opportunity to reevaluate
its position regarding the applicability of section 167(8)'s notice re-
quiremerit when an insurer denies coverage by reason of a "lack of
inclusion."
Gerald A. Hefner
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW
Custodial statements made by youth to his parent are inadmissi-
ble where youth was neither accorded privacy nor warned that
overheard statements may be used against him
In order to protect the privacy of certain confidential relation-
ships, the New York legislature has created a number of eviden-
tiary privileges which preclude the compelled disclosure of various
communications.9 2 Notwithstanding the early unwillingness of
some other reason is of no moment. The statute lays down an unconditional rule." Id. at
269-70, 265 N.E.2d at 739, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 314. Indeed, the Court noted that to require such
prejudice under the present statute would be to "[miss] the point of the statute, and the
evident purpose for its enactment." Id. at 269, 265 N.E.2d at 739, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
Thus, the Court stated, the insurer's failure to give written notice of disclaimer to the claim-
ant for 7 months was unreasonable despite the fact that no actual prejudice resulted. Id.
92 See CPLR 4502(b) (1963) ("husband or wife shall not be required, or, without con-
sent of the other .... allowed to disclose a confidential communication made by one to the
other during marriage"); id. 4503(a) (privilege extending to confidential communications be-
tween attorney and client); id. 4504(a) (physician-patient privilege); id. 4505 (a clergyman
"shall not be allowed to disclose a confession or confidence made to him in his professional
character as spiritual advisor"); id. 4507 (confidential communications between a psycholo-
gist and his patient are "placed on the same basis as those provided by law between attor-
ney and client"); id. 4508 (social worker may "not be required to disclose a communication
made by his client to him ... in the course of his professional employment"). Each privi-
lege specified in the CPLR is subject to exception. The spousal privilege, for example, only
protects those exchanges that "would not have been made but for the absolute confidence
in, and induced by, the marital relationship." People v. Melski, 10 N.Y.2d 78, 80, 176
N.E.2d 81, 83, 217 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (1961). Similarly, the attorney-client privilege only
shields those communications made in confidence, or intended to be made in confidence, by
a client seeking professional advice. In re Jacqueline F., 47 N.Y.2d 215, 219, 391 N.E.2d 967,
970, 417 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (1979). The physician-patient privilege is restricted to "medical
information, or at least information which is relevant to some medical purpose" given by a
patient to his doctor. CPLR 4504, commentary at 197 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); see
Polsky v. Union Mut. Stock Life Ins. Co., 80 App. Div. 2d 777, 778, 436 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745
(1st Dep't 1981) (privilege did not extend to the patient's discussion of suicide with his
dentist). To be entitled to claim the clergyman-penitent privilege, the penitent must have
been seeking "religious counsel, advice, solace, absolution or ministration" from the clergy-
man when he made the statement in question. In re Fuhrer, 100 Misc. 2d 315, 320, 419
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:178
courts to create common-law exemptions from disclosure, 3 in 1978
the judiciary recognized a parent-child privilege.94 Questions as to
the scope of this privilege, however, have gone unanswered 5 Re-
cently, in People v. Harrell,9 6 the Appellate Division, Second De-
partment, defining the breadth of the parent-child privilege, held
that custodial inculpatory statements made by a minor to his par-
ent are privileged unless the defendant was afforded the right to
N.Y.S.2d 426, 431 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County), aff'd mem., 72 App. Div. 2d 813, 421
N.Y.S.2d 906 (2d Dep't 1979), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 611, 425 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1980). The
privilege that exists for communications between a psychologist and his patient is restricted
in the same manner as those between an attorney and his client. See CPLR 4507 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1981-1982). Finally, a social worker can be forced to reveal a client's intent to
commit a crime or harmful act. CPLR 4508(2) (Supp. 1981-1982); see Perry v. Fiumano, 61
App. Div. 2d 512, 518, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (4th Dep't 1978).
91 See People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 295, 199
N.E. 415, 416 (1936) (the trend is to restrict, rather than to expand, the classes to whom the
privilege from disclosure is granted).
" See In re A & M, 61 App. Div. 2d 426, 429, 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378, 381 (4th
Dep't 1978); see also People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 716, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312
(Westchester County Ct. 1979). See generally Kaplan, Mason Ladd and Interesting Cases,
66 IOWA L. REv. 931, 944-47 (1981); Note, Questioning the Recognition of a Parent-Child
Testimonial Privilege, 45 ALB. L. RPv. 142, 142-45 (1980); Comment, People v. Doe: Alter-
native Means of Protecting the Child-Parent Relationship, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 223,
226-29 (1979) (right of privacy within the family). In A & M, the court concluded that,
although the creation of a privilege is within the province of the legislature, communications
between a minor and his parents made in the privacy of the home should be accorded con-
stitutional protection. 61 App. Div. 2d at 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381. The defendant's par-
ents, therefore, were permitted to refuse to answer questions at a grand jury proceeding
investigating an arson allegedly committed by the defendant. Id. at 435, 403 N.Y.S.2d at
381. In Fitzgerald, the court held that a privilege attached to a conversation between a
father and his adult son regarding the latter's involvement in a hit-and-run accident. 101
Misc. 2d at 724-25, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 317; see also Michelet P. v. Gold, 70 App. Div. 2d 68,
73-74, 419 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2d Dep't 1979) (parent-child privilege applies to confession
made by child to guardian during police interrogation). But see In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp.
400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (motion to quash a grand jury subpoena was denied upon the
ground that no parent-child privilege existed); Berggren v. Reilly, 95 Misc. 2d 486, 489, 407
N.Y.S.2d 960, 962 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1978) (in personal injury action, father could be
questioned as to what his infant son told him about the accident).
An additional judicially created privilege extends to "confidential communications be-
tween public officers, and to public officers, in the performance of their duties," where se-
crecy is found to be in the public interest. People v. Keating, 286 App. Div. 150, 152-53, 141
N.Y.S.2d 562, 565 (1st Dep't 1955).
11 See People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 714, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (Westchester
County Ct. 1979). Proposed legislation, which recognizes a qualified parent-child privilege,
provides that neither a parent nor a child should be required or allowed to divulge the
substance of their communications with each other except in proceedings between the par-
ents, or between the parent and child, or in proceedings involving an act committed by one
of the parties against the other. N.Y.S. 9090, N.Y.A. 221, 205th Sess. (1982).
" 87 App. Div. 2d 21, 450 N.Y.S.2d 501 (2d Dep't 1982).
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communicate privately or was warned that any overheard utter-
ances may be used against him.9
7
In Harrell, the defendant, a 17-year-old youth, was arrested
shortly after stabbing the proprietor of a stationery store during
the course of a robbery.98 The police brought the defendant into
custody and, although no interrogation was conducted, advised
him of his Miranda rights.9 9 The defendant's mother arrived at the
police station later that evening.100 For alleged "security" purposes,
a detective accompanied her to the defendant's cell and stood
"nearby" while mother and son conferred.101 The detective, having
overheard the defendant confess to the stabbing, was permitted to
testify against the defendant at trial.102
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held
that the trial judge erred in admitting the defendant's statement
into evidence.1 03 Presiding Justice Mollen, writing for a unanimous
court,10 4 initially stated that although the detective's conduct could
not be considered a sham designed to overhear the defendant's
statements, the lack of police misconduct was not determinative of
admissibility.1 0 5 After examining recent New York cases in which a
9 Id. at 26, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 504. The court ruled that if neither privacy nor warnings
are given to a detained youth and his parent, all listeners should be barred from testifying
against him at trial. Id.
98 Id. at 22, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 502-03. The polic; arrived at the scene of the robbery and,
within minutes, were told that three black men, one of whom was wearing a brown coat,
were involved in the incident and had been seen running toward a particular apartment
house. Id. at 22, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 502. The officers thereafter pursued several men who fit
the description. Id. Although the defendant, Harrell, violently resisted arrest, he eventually
was subdued by two police officers. Id.
99 Id. at 23, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
Ioo d.
101 Id. The detective who remained near the defendant's cell explained that his conduct
was necessary for "'security'" purposes. Id. Indeed, in addition to resisting arrest, the de-
fendant had continued his "belligerent posture" while in custody. Id. at 24, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
503.
1o2 Id. at 23, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 503. When asked by his mother whether he had stabbed
anyone, the defendant answered "Yes." Id. When asked why he stabbed the victim, the
defendant responded that he did not know. Id.
103 Id. at 27, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 505. Although the Second Department held that a parent-
child privilege prevented the admission of the defendant's statement to his mother, the
court nevertheless found that such error was harmless in view of the other evidence against
him. Id.
1o, Justices Titone, Gibbons, and Thompson joined in the opinion of Presiding Justice
Mollen.
105 Id. at 24, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 503. Presiding Justice Mollen noted that although there
was no "definite indication that the defendant would actually turn violent against his own
mother," the detective's insistence on remaining close to the defendant's cell could not be
19821
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parent-child privilege was found to exist,106 the court recognized
the appropriateness of the privilege when a youth, arrested for a
serious crime, seeks parental assistance "in the unfriendly environs
of a police precinct.' 107 Turning to the scope of the privilege in
such a setting, Justice Mollen ruled that the law enforcement
agents either must afford the defendant conditions of privacy for
his communication, warn him of the possibility that overheard
statements may be attested to at trial, or bar all hearers from testi-
fying where neither privacy-nor warnings are given. 108 The Harrell
court, determining that these conditions were not met, concluded
that the detective's testimony should not have been admitted at
trial. 0 9
It is submitted that the Harrell court, in defining the parame-
ters of the parent-child privilege for custodial statements uttered
viewed as a pretext. Id.
'0 See In re A & M, 61 App. Div. 2d 426, 435, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (4th Dep't 1978);
People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 717, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 313 (Westchester County Ct.
1979); supra note 94.
107 87 App. Div. 2d at 26, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 504. Concluding that the parent-child privi-
lege is appropriate for statements made by a youth in a custodial setting, the court reasoned
that it is "fair" that a parent be permitted to converse with his or her child free from "the
overhearing presence of government agents." Id. Moreover, the court, recognizing that a
youthful prisoner often will turn to his parents for assistance, stated that "the law will
brook no police conduct aimed at isolating a youthful suspect from his family." Id. at 24,
450 N.Y.S.2d at 503; see People v. Bevilacqua, 45 N.Y.2d 508, 511, 382 N.E.2d 1326, 1327,
410 N.Y.S.2d 549, 550 (1978) (police refused defendant's requests to notify his mother);
People v. Townsend, 33 N.Y.2d 37, 41, 300 N.E.2d 722, 724, 347 N.Y.S.2d 187, 190 (1973)
(police denied that the defendant was in custody when his parent sought to locate him);
People v. Evans, 70 App. Div. 2d 886, 887, 417 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101 (2d Dep't 1979) (police
moved the defendant to another station in order to prevent his mother from being present
at the interrogation).
100 87 App. Div. 2d at 27, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 505; see People v. Brown, 82 Misc. 2d 115,
120-21, 368 N.Y.S.2d 645, 651 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974). In Brown, policemen standing
nearby, overheard a telephone conversation between the defendant and his minister. 82
Misc. at 119, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 650. During the conversation, the defendant loudly declared
that he had killed a man. Id. After noting that a communication made to a minister typi-
cally is privileged, the court, promulgating the guidelines which the Harrell court applied to
the parent-child privilege, see supra note 97 and accompanying text, held that the defen-
dant's statement was inadmissible. Id. at 120-21, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
109 87 App. Div. 2d at 27, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 505. In addition to the defendant's declara-
tion to his mother, the other evidence tending to establish the defendant's guilt included an
admission which he made to a companion while riding in a patrol car..Id. at 23, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 503. The defendant's admission was overheard, and thereafter testified to by
the accompanying police officers. Id. The court stated that such declaration was admissible
since it was not in response to any police interrogation in the absence of counsel, but rather
was spontaneous and voluntary. Id. at 23-24, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 503; see People v. Kaye, 25
N.Y.2d 139, 143-44, 250 N.E.2d 329, 331-32, 303 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44-46 (1969).
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by a detained youth, has adopted an approach which preserves the
vitality of the privilege without placing undue restrictions upon
the admissibility of probative evidence. While it is recognized that
the creation of the privilege was based largely upon the reluctance
of courts to compel parents to testify against their children, 1 0 it is
nevertheless apparent that the privilege is designed to prevent an
inadvertent waiver of the child's fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination.11 The Harrell decision, though not guarantee-
ing private conferences between a youth and his parent,1 2 protects
the parent-child relationship by assuring that a parent will not un-
knowingly induce his or her child into making inculpatory state-
ments which subsequently may be used against him.113
It is suggested further that the approach taken by the Harrell
court is preferable to the analyses employed in the attorney-client
and spousal privilege contexts. First, the court's reluctance to es-
tablish an absolute right of privacy under the present circum-
stances heeds the notion that the parent-child relationship, unlike
the relationship between attorney and client, is not protected by
the sixth amendment.11 Indeed, it is clear that, notwithstanding
110 See In re A & M, 61 App. Div. 2d 426, 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (4th Dep't 1978).
The A & M court, in recognizing the existence of a parent-child privilege, stated:
Surely the thought of the State forcing a mother and father to reveal their child's
alleged misdeeds, as confessed to them in private, to provide the basis for criminal
charges is shocking to our sense of decency, fairness and propriety. It is inconsis-
tent with the way of life we cherish and guard so carefully and raises the specter
of a regime which encourages betrayal of one's offspring.
Id.
1 See Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential Communications: An Exami-
nation and Proposal, 16 FAm. L.Q. 1, 34 (1982). New York courts have exhibited concern
over the possibility that a minor in custody, who is without the advice of a parent or guard-
ian, might unintentionally waive his right against self-incrimination. See In re Aaron D., 30
App. Div. 2d 183, 185, 290 N.Y.S.2d 935, 937 (1st Dep't 1968) (parents must be notified of
youth's rights to remain silent and to have counsel present at interrogation in order to safe-
guard the child's fifth amendment right); In re William L., 29 App. Div. 2d 182, 184, 287
N.Y.S.2d 218, 221 (2d Dep't 1968) (delinquency adjudication reversed because child's
mother was not informed of son's rights). But cf. People v. Taylor, 16 N.Y.2d 1038, 1039-40,
213 N.E.2d 321, 321, 265 N.Y.S.2d 913, 913 (1965) (a defendant does not have a constitu-
tional right to consult with his family prior to interrogation).
11 See 87 App. Div. 2d at 26, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
, See Stanton, supra note 111, at 36-37. It has been suggested that privacy for custo-
dial communications between parent and child is necessary to decrease the possibility that
the latter's incriminating statements subsequently will be used against him. Id. at 36. With-
out such privacy, the child who is accompanied by a parent may be more likely to waive his
rights inadvertently than the unaccompanied youth, thereby defeating the policy underlying
the encouragement of a parent's presence. Id.
114 See People v. Bryne, 47 N.Y.2d 117, 123, 390 N.E.2d 760, 763, 417 N.Y.S.2d 42, 45
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the state's interest in obtaining evidence, an absolute privilege for
attorney-client communications 15 is justified by the lawyer's
unique ability to safeguard constitutional rights.116 It is submitted,
however, that there is no similar vindication for a broad parent-
child privilege. In addition, the protection afforded by the qualified
spousal privilege, which permits eavesdroppers to testify to over-
heard conversations, 1 7 does not afford a level of privacy sufficient
to prevent unwitting waivers of the child's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination.' 18 It appears, therefore, that the Harrell
court indeed has applied the "fair[est] and [most] reasonable" ap-
proach 9 to the question of whether custodial statements made by
a youth to his parent may be testified to by an overhearing third
party.
Jane M. Knight
(1979); see also Fusco v. Moses, 304 N.Y. 424, 433, 107 N.E.2d 581, 585 (1952) (petitioner's
right to private consultation with an attorney was impaired by the presence of an informer
posing as a codefendant); People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 482-83, 53 N.E.2d 356, 357
(1944) (defendant has a right to a "private interview" with attorney).
"' Unlike the spousal privilege, which allows eavesdroppers to testify to overheard
communications between a husband and wife, the attorney-client privilege does not permit
unknown third parties to testify to conversations between an attorney and his client. See
CPLR 4503(a) (Supp. 1981-1982). It should be noted, however, that the privilege extending
to communications between attorney and client did not always prevent eavesdroppers from
testifying to the content of such communications. See Lanza v. New York State Joint Legis-
lative Comm. on Gov't Operations, 3 N.Y.2d 92, 97-98, 143 N.E.2d 772, 774-75, 164 N.Y.S.2d
9, 12-13, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957). Additionally, while it is clear that the known
presence of a third party will destroy the spousal privilege, see People v. Ressler, 17 N.Y.2d
174, 179, 216 N.E.2d 582, 584, 269 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (1966); People v. Melski, 10 N.Y.2d 78,
80, 176 N.E.2d 81, 83, 217 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (1961); People v. Allen, 104 Misc. 2d 136, 137, 427
N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1980), the attorney-client privilege is not
abrogated by the known presence of an indispensible third party, see People v. Harris, 84
App. Div. 2d 63, 108, 445 N.Y.S.2d 520, 548 (2d Dep't 1981). In Harrell, the factual circum-
stances did not indicate clearly whether the detective's presence was known to the defen-
dant and his mother. See 87 App. Div. 2d at 23, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 503. It is suggested,
therefore, that the applicability of the parent-child privilege, at least for communications
that take place in a custodial setting, is not dependent upon the known or unknown pres-
ence of eavesdropping law enforcement agents.
"I See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719, 722 (1979). In Fare, the Supreme Court
observed that the attorney is "the one person to whom society as a whole looks as the pro-
tector of ... legal right," id. at 719, and that this role justifies a distinction between re-
quests for a lawyer and requests for a "probation officer, a clergyman, or a close friend," id.
at 722; see also People v. Byrne, 47 N.Y.2d 117, 123, 390 N.E.2d 760, 763, 417 N.Y.S.2d 42,
45 (1979) (there is no constitutional right to consult with those who do not possess the
lawyer's special abilities).
7 See supra note 115.
8 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
119 87 App. Div. 2d at 27, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
